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Hegel and Chinese Marxism
Tom ROCKMORE*1 
Abstract
China is presently embarking on the huge task of realizing what President Xi Jinping 
recently called the Chinese Dream. China is officially Marxist, and Marx thus inspires 
this dream in his assigned status as the “official guide” to the ongoing Chinese Revolution. 
This paper will focus on the crucial relation between Hegel and Chinese Marxism. Marx 
is a key Hegelian, critical of, but strongly dependent on, Hegel. Since the Chinese Dream 
is not Hegelian, but rather anti-Hegelian, it is unlikely, as I will be arguing, to be realized 
in a recognizably Marxian form.
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Hegel in kitajski marksizem
Izvleček
Kitajska se podaja na pot uresničitve projekta, ki ga je predsednik Xi Jinping pred kratkim 
imenoval »kitajske sanje«. Kitajska je uradno marksistična in Marx zaradi statusa »urad-
nega vodiča« sedanje kitajske revolucije, ki so mu ga pripisali, navdihuje te sanje. Članek 
se bo osredotočil na ključno razmerje med Heglom in kitajskim marksizmom. Marx je 
ključni hegelianec, ki do Hegla ni le kritičen, ampak je tudi odvisen od njega. »Kitajske 
sanje« pa niso hegelianske, temveč prej antihegelianske, zato je, kot bo razloženo, malo 
verjetno, da se bodo uresničile v prepoznavno marksistični obliki. 
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On the Relation of Marx and Hegel
Marx’s followers as well as his critics tend to approach him through Marxism. 
Classical Marxism, often called simply Marxism, is the theory invented by En-
gels and further developed by his followers. Engels, who has positivist tendencies, 
substitutes science for philosophy in his reading of Marx. His study of Feuerbach 
presents an influential view later restated by him and others. 
Engels often suggests, incorrectly in my view, that Marx is responsible for the ex-
tra-philosophical, scientific component of Marxism. One of the more important 
passages occurs in his speech at Marx’s graveside. In the eulogy, Engels generously 
compares Marx to Darwin. He claims that Marx “discovered the law of develop-
ment of human history,” which, if this is a reference to political economy, presum-
ably means that economics is prior to every other explanatory factor, specifically in 
its capacity as “the special law of motion governing the present-day capitalist mode 
of production and bourgeois society that this mode of production has created.” (En-
gels 1989, 468) Other observers reject this interpretation of Marx. According to 
Ernest Mandel, a Trotskyist theoretician, “He [i. e. Marx] was not seeking universal 
laws of economic organization. Indeed, one of the essential theses of Capital is that 
no such laws exist.” (Mandel 1982, 11) Similarly, in his recent biography of Marx, 
G. S. Jones calls attention to the difference between Engels’ favourable comparison 
of Marx’s view, which he describes as the establishment of the law of historical de-
velopment, and Darwin’s theory of natural selection that, Jones points out, is not and 
should not be interpreted as deterministic. (see Stedman Jones 2016, 566)
Despite its limits, Engels’ anti-Hegelian interpretation of Marx quickly became 
canonical. His anti-Hegelian approach to Marx has long influenced Russian 
Marxism and continues to influence Chinese Marxism. In broad terms Chinese 
Marxism is dependent on two main sources: Russian Marxism and the Chinese 
intellectual tradition. The shared Russian and Chinese anti-Hegelian interpreta-
tion of Marx was called into question in the middle of the last century through 
the relatively late publication of crucial Marxian texts, that is texts prepared by 
Marx and that are crucial for understanding his position. 
Russian Marxism is strongly influenced by Lenin, who was active early in the 
twentieth century. When he was active, a number of important writings, crucial 
for understanding Marx’s position, were still unpublished. They include the Paris 
Manuscripts, the Grundrisse, the manuscripts routinely known as Theories of Surplus 
Value, the German Ideology, and so on. 
Lenin’s political credentials exceed either his philosophical training or his philo-
sophical competence. Lenin was interested in and, unlike Engels, partly trained 
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in philosophy. But he was understandably more concerned with bringing about a 
successful revolution than in winning a philosophical debate. His understanding 
of both Marx and Marxism is almost wholly based on Engels rather than on 
Marx. In his most important philosophical foray, Materialism and Empiriocriti-
cism, he cites Engels more than three hundred times but Marx only once. 
Lenin’s interest in Hegel was stimulated by his teacher, Plekhanov, a Hegelian 
Marxist. Lenin was initially concerned with Hegel at the very end of the nine-
teenth century. He later returned to Hegel after he wrote Materialism and Em-
piriocriticism (1909), particularly several years later when he was writing his “Phil-
osophical Notebooks” (1914). This unfinished text reflects his effort to master 
Aristotle, Feuerbach, Marx and Deborin, but above all Hegel.1 
Due to his early death, Lenin did not live to develop his understanding of He-
gel. Stalin, Lenin’s political heir, later codified the Marxist account of Marx. In 
“Dialectical and Historical Materialism” he notes, in silently conflating Marx and 
Engels and in paraphrasing the former’s remarks on dialectic in the Afterword to 
the second edition of Capital vol. 1, that Marx and Engels took from the Hege-
lian dialectics only its “rational kernel” while casting aside its idealistic shell. Ac-
cording to Stalin, Marx provided dialectic with a modern scientific form. Though 
there were Hegelian Marxists such as Ewald Ilyenkov in the Soviet Union, in part 
because of the enduring influence of Engels, Russian Marxism has always been 
basically anti-Hegelian, and if Marx is a Hegelian, anti-Marxian.
On the Soviet Background of Chinese Marxism
Individual Chinese thinkers, perhaps foremost among them Zhang Shiying (see 
Wang 2014, 90–96), are centrally interested in Hegel. Yet Chinese Marxism 
mainly follows the anti-Hegelian lead of Engels, traditional Marxism, and Rus-
sian Marxism for two reasons. On the one hand, there is the political pressure to 
maintain the Marxist vision of Marx. On the other, there is the fact that Chinese 
Marxism, like Russian Marxism, arose before the publication in the middle of 
the last century of crucial Marxian texts pointing to Hegel’s central role in the 
formulation of Marx’s position. 
The discovery of Hegelian Marxism by Lukàcs and Korsch in the early 1920s 
had a powerful and enduring impact. With exceptions, it is at least plausible that 
Western Marxism as a whole can be described as broadly Hegelian. (see Anderson 
1976) In the absence of statistics, it is difficult to be precise about the importance 
1 See, for a sympathetic reading of Lenin’s efforts to master Hegel, Anderson 1995.
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of Hegel in the Chinese Marxist debate. The Hegel debate in China, though per-
haps large––though how large is unclear––if for no other reason than the large 
number of Chinese Marxists, is comparatively small. In any case it is not large in 
comparison to the discussion of Chinese Marxism. The debate on Chinese Marx-
ism is omnipresent, though mainly on the ideological level. Anyone who has spent 
time in China is aware that ideological, forced-feeding of the Chinese version of 
Marxism is obligatory fare for all Chinese students. To the best of my knowledge 
no Chinese university lacks a Marxist school. These, however, routinely dispense a 
form of Marxist propaganda that differs in kind from philosophical Marxism that 
is studied in some but not all departments of philosophy. 
It is important to distinguish between those who inculcate Marx and Marxism 
as a form of propaganda and those who study it seriously, as one would study 
other forms of philosophy. The subjective impression of the present writer is that 
Chinese students of Marx and Marxism are often less aware of Marxism outside 
China than their Western counterparts. For obvious reasons, given such factors 
as the important language barrier, Hegel’s criticism of Chinese philosophy, and 
the strong official Chinese identification with Marxist ideology, Chinese Marxist 
students often have a relatively weak grasp of Western Marxism. Other reasons 
include the fact that Chinese scholars tend not to know German, or at least not 
to know it well, not to be more than distantly aware of the Western Hegelian 
Marxist discussion, nor to be more than vaguely familiar with recent Western 
Marxist publications, and so on. Though there are exceptions, above all Li Zehou, 
in comparison to Western Marxists the Chinese show relatively less interest in or 
awareness of Hegelian Marxism. 
Li’s anthropological ontology, the basis of his approach to modernity, underlies his 
effort to transform Kant’s dualistic theory of subjectivity into a monistic, materialist 
theory of subjectivity. His theory is both original and atypical of the Chinese Marx-
ist debate. 2 It is thus not surprising if a recent study of Chinese Marxism has noth-
ing specific to say about the role of Hegel in Chinese Marxism. (see Chan 2003)
Chinese Marxism arose in stages, initially through translations from German, 
Russian and Japanese sources early in the twentieth century. It later developed 
through the importation into China of the influential Russian debate between the 
mechanists and the dialecticians (or so-called Deborinists) concerning Marxist 
materialism. This debate, which is sometimes cast as the first great debate of Sovi-
et philosophy, interested Nikolai Bukharin, a tragic political figure later liquidated 
by Stalin, and as well as Stalin himself, who favoured the mechanists. 
2 See, for an exception, Gu 1996, 205–45.
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Russian mechanists were mainly concerned with science or the philosophy of 
science. They tended like Engels to favour natural science. Lyubov Akselrod, the 
leading mechanist, was better known under the pseudonym Ortodoks. She stud-
ied in Berne and later became a Marxist. In the debate on empiriocriticism she 
criticized both Lenin and Bogdanov. As a Marxist she was allied with Plekhanov. 
Russian dialecticians, unlike the mechanists, were interested in Hegel, and, as the 
term suggests, took a dialectical approach fostered by Abram Deborin, a Soviet 
Marxist philosopher, and his allies. Deborin was a member of the Academy of 
Sciences and a former Menshevik. Kolakowski captures the main theme here in 
a single sentence: 
The opposition between the mechanists and the dialecticians represented 
the opposition of the natural sciences to philosophical interference, while 
the dialecticians stood for the supremacy of philosophy over the sciences 
and thus reflected the characteristic tendency of Soviet ideological devel-
opment (Kolakowski 1978, 64).
In 1929 at a meeting of the Second All-Union Conference of Marxist-Leninist 
Scientific Institutions a resolution was passed condemning mechanism. In nor-
mal circumstances, this would have meant an end to the debate. Yet one year 
later the controversy broke out anew over the suspicion of “menshivizing ideal-
ism,” or rendering idealism politically acceptable. This term, which was in wide 
use from approximately 1930 until 1950, referred to the supposed separation of 
theory and practice as well as other egregious errors allegedly committed by the 
Deborinists. The so-called new view, which was advanced by M. B. Mitin and P. F. 
Yudin, adopted dialectical materialism as well as the so-called dialectics of nature 
favoured by Engels and the mechanists, and later Stalin. This view, which was 
represented by Mitin and Yudin, was later codified in Stalin’s view of dialectical 
materialism in his “History of the CPSU (Short Course, 1938).” (see Stalin 1941) 
Philosophy at the time was not for the faint of heart. Deborin, the central figure 
for the dialecticians, and Akselrod, the central figure for the mechanists, both 
survived, but many other participants in the debate simply disappeared.
Chinese Marxism Reacts against Soviet Marxism
The Soviet debate between the mechanists and the dialecticians that was influ-
ential in the Russian Marxist debate was also influential in the development of 
Chinese Marxism. With Stalin’s support, Mitin quickly rose through the ranks. 
In the 1930s Chinese dialectical materialism was formalized under his influence 
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on the Chinese debate. Li Da and Ai Siqi translated many of Mitin’s writings 
into Chinese. The Chinese Marxists strongly supported Mitin against Deborin. 
(see Knight 2005) Then as now, the Chinese were understandably uninterested in 
following foreign models.
This disinterest in simply taking over a foreign model not surprisingly led to an 
interest in working out a form of Marxism applicable to the specific Chinese sit-
uation. Mao Zedong, for instance, was later critical of Mitin’s so-called new phi-
losophy, hence of Stalin’s conception of dialectical materialism. In the late 1930s, 
Mao, under Engels’ influence, began to develop a Chinese version of dialectical 
materialism in emphasizing the concepts of contradiction and practice. For main-
ly political reasons, Mao’s view continued to be influential until at least the 1970s. 
Yet trained Western philosophers are often sceptical of Mao’s philosophical un-
derstanding and intellectual accomplishments. Leszek Kolakowski, for instance, 
who knew Marxism very well, described Mao’s so-called peasant Marxism as “a 
series of repetitions of a few commonplaces of Leninist Stalinist Marxism.” (see 
Kolakowski 1978, 3: 499)
The term “Mao sixiang,” or Mao’s thought, which is described as “Marxism-Len-
inism applied in a Chinese context,” was officially adopted in the Chinese Con-
stitution. Yet after Deng Xiaoping said it was not always necessary to follow Mao, 
his position was often disregarded. For instance, on a recent anniversary of the 
Cultural Revolution the Chinese government said that this series of events was a 
mistake that would not be repeated. 
Still, Mao’s view continued to be influential at least into the 1970s, mainly for 
political reasons. Mao was especially interested in practice and contradiction 
(maodun). In “On Practice” he argues that knowledge comes from practice, and 
that true knowledge is verified by practice and other approaches fail to grasp the 
importance of dialectical materialism. According to Mao, the truth-value of ideas 
can only be judged in practice. In “On Contradiction” he breaks with Marx in 
following Engels’ view that contradiction is present in matter itself as well as in 
ideas in the brain. According to Mao, there is always a struggle between different 
contradictory aspects as well as what he called a principal contradiction. The class 
struggle, which is the main contradiction, can only be resolved through a revolu-
tion that overcomes the antagonism between labour and capital. 
Chinese Marxism in the post-Mao period is, like the great Confucian classics, 
and like China itself, intensely practical.3 Deng Xiaoping is often said to have 
saved the Chinese economy after the Cultural Revolution, and typically insisted 
3 See, for recent helpful discussion, Xu 2016.
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on practice almost to the exclusion of theory. Beginning in 1978, he promoted 
the slogan shishi-qiushi. This was mentioned in a speech at the Sixth National 
Congress CCP in reference to pragmatism, and later became a key element of 
Maoism. Beginning in 1978, this slogan was promoted by Deng as a central com-
ponent of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In echoing this slogan, Deng 
famously said it does not matter if a cat is white or black so long as it catches mice. 
In a widely known article that captures Deng’s pragmatic approach, Hu Fuming, 
an associate professor of philosophy at Nanking University proclaimed: “Practice 
is the sole criterion for testing truth” (1978) (Hu 1993).
The phrase identified with Deng suggests two points concerning the origin and 
interpretation of this slogan. On the one hand, there is its origin. As is often the 
case in China, slogans that come to the attention of the public have a long prior 
tradition. An example is President Xi Jinping’s recent reference in a visit to the 
National Museum of China (2012) to the “Chinese Dream” (zhongguo meng or 
zhongguomeng). 
Xi’s language here is consistent with Chinese political practice. All series of 
Chinese presidents have coined slogans. Jiang Zemin proposed the slogan “Three 
Represents” to suggest that the Communist Party of China represents advanced 
social forces, advanced culture, and the interests of the majority. Hu Jintao sug-
gested the idea of a moderately well-off society in referring to the Confucian term 
xiao kang she hui. This term describes a society composed of a functional middle 
class. According to President Xi, the Chinese dream includes the “Four Compre-
hensives” or si ge quan mian zhan lüe bu ju. This slogan refers to the conception of a 
moderately prosperous society, including deepening reform, governing according 
to law, and the strict governance of the party.
This phrase was originally written during the Southern Song dynasty by the poet, 
Zheng Sixiao’s poem, “Flowing Spring.” Zheng composed the famous line: “Heart full 
of [the] China Dream.” Similarly, Deng’s slogan that was cited earlier by Mao Zedong 
in 1938 can be traced back as early as the Han Dynasty. The Book of Han, also known 
as the History of the Former Han, a history of China finished in 111, contains the fol-
lowing passage: “he jian xian wang de yi xiao jing qian er nian li xiu gu shishi—qiushi.” 
The proper interpretation of this phrase is unclear. “Shishi qiushi” means to seek 
truth from facts, as in the idiom about a practical and realistic work style, “shishi-
qiushi de gongzuo zuofeng.” Deng’s famous insistence on practice over theory could 
mean different things. In the West the distinction between theory and practice 
goes all the way back in the philosophical tradition to Aristotle. Late in the 18th 
century, Kant identifies the difficulty in an article titled “On the common saying: 
That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice” (1793). 
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Marx’s initial criticisms of Hegel in the early 1840s already point to the difference 
between traditional philosophy, which he thinks is satisfied with mere theory that 
changes nothing other than itself, and a new form of theory that realizes itself 
in changing practice. At stake, as Marx famously points out, is only interpreting 
the world, or on the other hand changing it. Following Marx, Marxism routinely 
stresses the pre-eminence of practice over theory. With that distinction in mind, 
Deng’s slogan might be intended to signal the interest in practice, or to indicate 
a relative emphasis on practice over theory, or again to point out that practice is 
the highest value, or even some combination of the above. We cannot answer that 
question here. But suffice to say that Deng was centrally concerned in the midst of 
the political and social chaos that occurred in the wake of the Cultural Revolution 
to focus attention on practice, especially the economy. With that in mind, we can 
say that in this specific context Deng’s emphasis on practice was a strategic move 
that enabled him to undertake deep revisions to Mao’s policies.
The pragmatic, anti-theoretical transformation of Chinese Marxism continues to-
day. As in the Soviet Union during Stalin’s time, it is reflected in the use of prim-
ers to inculcate a specific governmental view of Marxism-Leninism at all levels 
of the Chinese educational system. Yet care is taken to avoid any criticism of the 
government in its task as the self-anointed guardian of the Chinese Marxist view. 
An important example lies in the debate on humanism in the West after the 
publication of the Paris Manuscripts. This text contains an important account of 
alienation. Alienation and humanism are linked concepts. Alienation points to 
the failure to develop as an individual in modern industrial society. Humanism 
focusses on the idea of the realization of human beings as individuals as the goal 
of a future version of modern industrial society. The discussion of alienation pro-
duced a split between Marx and Marxism. It simultaneously called attention to 
the important philosophical core in Marx’s position as well as to the possible link 
of Marxist institutional practices with forms of alienation. 
In the West, in reaction to the relatively late publication of Marx’s Paris Manuscripts 
as well as the Grundrisse, the French Marxist philosopher Althusser rushed to the 
defence of Marxism. The French thinker’s view, which was clearly intended to support 
the one institutionalized in the French Communist Party, was that the mature Marx 
was a scientist who, in following Feuerbach away from Hegel as well as idealism and 
philosophy toward science, had decisively left his early philosophical interests behind.
The theme of Marx’s humanism played out in an analogous manner in the East as 
well. In China, reference to this concept could be taken as criticism of the Chinese 
government. After 1978, after the Cultural Revolution, after the downfall of the 
Gang of Four, and after Mao had left the scene, a new intellectual discussion with 
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important humanist elements quickly arose. This moved away from a discussion 
dominated by the needs of the Party and toward debate loosely centred on what 
can be called traditional humanism. The lead up to the debate on alienation be-
gan with discussion of the criterion of truth in 1978, before quickly turning to 
the concepts of humanism and alienation in linking together the ability to think 
independently with the concept of a human being.4 
The theme of alienation was raised in early 1980 by Zhao Yang, deputy director 
of the PCC propaganda department, and Wang Ruoshui, deputy director of the 
People’s Daily. Around 1983, the theme of “man” (ren) was a central topic in all the 
Chinese social and human sciences. (see Wang 1983) The Chinese government, 
which took this debate as threatening, rapidly intervened. Hu Qiaomu, the Par-
ty’s chief ideological authority, accused its participants of supporting bourgeois 
humanism.5 But Li Keming, president of South China Normal University, further 
insisted that Marxist philosophy needed to deal with the problem of alienation.6 
Gao Ertai also played an important role here.7 In a long article entitled “Humanism: 
A Memorandum on the Contemporary Debate,” he refuted Hu Qiaomu and sup-
ported humanist Marxists accused of being sources of “spiritual pollution.”8 Since 
Deng had already made known his views in his speech, Gao’s publication required 
considerable courage, like Xu Changfu’s writings today. Gao later published his 
views on alienation in an article entitled “On the Concept of Alienation.”9
All in all, in view of its importance, the Chinese Marxist debate on alienation, 
which lasted from 1980 to 1984, was very short, in no small measure because the 
political authorities took steps to end it as quickly as possible. It is then not an 
accident that, in his speech on October 3, 1983 entitled “The Party’s urgent tasks 
on the organizational and ideological fronts,” Deng said that alienation could 
not occur in a socialist country, and need not be discussed since that would only 
confuse the people.10 
4 For remarks on humanism and alienation, I rely on Yuhuai He 2001. 
5 See Hu Qiaomu, “On problems concerning humanism and alienation,” (“Guanyu rendao zhuyi 
yihua wenti,” in Renmin Ribao 27 January 1984). 
6 “A Marxist Philosophy Should Deal with the Alienation Theory (“Makesi zhuyi zhexue yao yanjiu 
yihua lilun”), in Guangzhou Ribao 8 December 1986.
7 For remarks on the discussion surrounding alienation in China, see Lin, Rosemont, and Ames 
1995, 727–58.
8 “rendaozhuyi – dangdai zhenglun de beiwanglu” in Sichuan shida xuebao, 4, 1986.
9 “lun yihua gainian” 1989.
10 Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 1982–1992. 
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Marxism in China currently bears little resemblance to Marxism as it is discussed 
and practiced in Western universities. Chinese Marxism is routinely referred to 
through the term “zhuyi,” meaning “ideology,” more precisely the political ideolo-
gy of the Chinese government in which it plays an important role. The history of 
Marxism has often been the theatre of intense theoretical struggles among pow-
erful intellectuals. In contrast, this intellectual dimension was much reduced in 
the Soviet Union, where it was simply not possible to disagree with Stalin’s view 
of Marxism. Chinese Marxism today mainly faithfully reflects the political views 
of the Chinese government. 
Hegelian and non-Hegelian Marxism
Marx’s position begins in a dialogue with Hegel that in different ways runs 
throughout his entire corpus. The proper interpretation of this dialogue remains 
controversial. After extensive discussion, it is fair to say that while much has been 
attempted little, not nearly enough, has been learned. The difference between He-
gelian and non-Hegelian Marxism is crucial. Marx’s reaction to and appropriation 
of Hegelian and other German idealist insights, and his criticism of Hegelian and 
German idealism, is not well understood. His relation to classical German phi-
losophy is also unclear. Marx’s position is based on the idea of the revolutionary 
subject, largely borrowed from Fichte, as self-developing in and through its inter-
action with others and with the surrounding natural world. But, as noted above, 
non-Hegelian Marxism is based on revolutionary self-development through 
knowledge of what Engels thinks is the law of human history.
The belated publication of a number of Marxian writings in mid-twentieth cen-
tury, above all the Paris Manuscripts and the Grundrisse, seems to many observers 
to tip the balance toward a Hegelian approach to Marx incompatible with other, 
non-Hegelian interpretations. Both texts suggest continuity, including a contin-
uous interaction with and reliance on Hegel, and in my own view to a lesser but 
crucial extent Fichte as well, rather than discontinuity in Marx’s development. 
Engels, who has always been central to the reception of Marx’s theories, was self-
taught in philosophy. He was neither competent to evaluate nor perhaps even to 
understand either Hegel’s theories or Marx’s reception of them. His lack of an 
adequate philosophical background is apparent in his literally fantastic suggestion 
that Kant’s thing in itself is overcome by practice and industry. (see Engels 1996, 
23) Classical Marxism, which is often simply identified as Marxism, is mainly 
due to Engels. Engels in turn relies on the supposedly crucial role of Feuerbach 
in Marx’s intellectual trajectory. According to Engels, Marx followed Feuerbach 
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away from Hegel, away from classical German philosophy, away from philosophy, 
and towards materialism and science. In sum, and according to Engels, Marx 
overcame his early false start in simply throwing aside Hegel and in opting in-
stead for the intellectual tools available in modern science.
This is not the place to provide an account of Marx’s relation to Hegel, even in 
outline. Suffice it to say that Hegel, who was the most important living German 
thinker when he died, only passed from the scene in 1831. Marx received a Ph.D. 
in philosophy in 1841, when, though his influence was declining, Hegel was still 
the central philosophical figure. As his widely known letter to his father indicates, 
Marx became deeply interested in Hegel while still an adolescent, and this inter-
est later continued throughout his career. 
Hegel’s views are inseparable from his continual interpretation of and reaction to 
Kant. Althusser notwithstanding, Marx’s lifelong dialogue with Hegel similarly 
takes different forms at different times. It includes: Hegelian treatment of ancient 
Greek materialism in the Dissertation, a Hegelian conception of the proletariat based 
on the master and slave passage in the Phenomenology of Spirit as the motor of a fu-
ture revolution, criticism of Hegel in the Paris Manuscripts as well as the formulation 
of Hegelian conceptions of objectification and alienation, a theory of surplus value 
based on the conception of self-objectification in a series of more economic writings, 
the restatement of the conception of alienation as fetishism in Capital, and so on. 
Marxism, which, like ice cream, comes in different flavours, advances different views 
of Hegel. With some exceptions, Western Marxism is Hegelian (see Anderson 
1976), and Hegel is an idealist. After Hegel’s death, the rise of German neo-Kan-
tianism and the rapid development of modern science turned attention away from 
idealism. Western, or in another formulation Hegelian, Marxism, was devised nearly 
simultaneously but independently in 1923 by Lukács and Korsch, the former more 
than the latter, in calling attention to the central Hegelian thrust of Marx’s position. 
On Human Flourishing
I have been suggesting that Marx is a critical Hegelian, but that traditional, Rus-
sian and Chinese forms of Marxism are all in related ways anti-Hegelian. What 
difference does it make? Philosophical theories are formulated to respond to per-
ceived difficulties, enigmas or conundra. It would thus be useful to address the 
main difficulty for which Marx’s position was formulated.
I suggest that Marx, who never turns his back on philosophy, instead seeks to re-
spond to a traditional philosophical concern. Though Marx is among other things 
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a student of modern industrial society, this is not and should not be seen as his 
basic concern. His main interest is not the so-called law of human history, nor the 
anatomy of modern industrial capitalism, nor the interpretation of ancient Greek 
materialism, nor a theory of alienation, nor the relation of superstructure and base, 
nor related difficulties, though all are important, but rather to identify and to pro-
mote the real conditions of what I will be calling human flourishing. 
The term “to flourish” refers to the social development of a fully-individual hu-
man being. This term presupposes a distinction between two kinds of needs. Basic 
or reproductive needs are often described through the canonical phrase of food, 
clothing and shelter. Human needs, or the need to develop as a human individual 
in realizing one’s person-specific capacities as a fully individual human being, pre-
suppose the capacity to respond to basic needs. Human flourishing, which runs 
throughout the Western tradition, takes different forms at different times. 
The Socratic concern with life in the social context continues in modern industrial 
society. Yet human flourishing is understood differently in Ancient Greece and in 
the modern world. In the former, it centres on happiness (eudaimonia) and/or virtue 
that in a class-based society was mainly reserved for the few. In the modern world, at 
least since Rousseau, a number of observers think it concerns freedom in all its many 
dimensions, understood as the full development of individuals. 
Now the relevance of philosophical theory to human social practice, precisely the 
difficulty that led Marx to insist on the need to transcend mere interpretation, is 
often regarded as suspect. Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx and others are 
centrally concerned with the general problem of human freedom in the modern 
social world. Rousseau gives this theme a modern form in famously remarking in 
the first sentence of the Social Contract that though human beings are born free, 
everywhere they are in chains. 
This striking formulation suggests a basic dualism encompassing an unwritten, 
tacit, but also unfulfilled contract with human society based on a difference in 
kind between the obviously mythical state of nature, in which human beings were 
supposedly free, and the various but unnatural forms of modern society in which 
one is in practice, and perhaps in theory as well, still not free. Life in the modern 
world is not directed toward returning to the state of nature. It is rather directed 
toward constructing a form of modernity that will bring about a more meaningful 
form of freedom than that supposedly abandoned in leaving the state of nature. 
Rousseau’s problem echoes in different ways throughout the later debate. Kant is 
aware of the need to understand freedom in the modern world, but unable to for-
mulate an acceptable approach to it within the confines of critical philosophy. His 
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view falters on an obvious contradiction: on the one hand, he describes freedom 
as rational self-determination; for instance, in acting according to the categori-
cal imperative. On the other, he runs up against the supposed compatibility, in 
fact an incompatibility, between dualistic conceptions of human action as whol-
ly self-determined and causal determinism in nature. According to Kant, mor-
al action requires formulating a universalizable moral rule and in fact so acting. 
Yet Kant cannot explain the transition from the a priori to the a posteriori, from 
self-determination in order to act morally to in fact acting morally in a world that 
is supposedly causally determined. 
Kant is mainly concerned with moral freedom, but Hegel is primarily con-
cerned with social freedom. Hegel’s view of freedom is understood in many 
different ways. Many observers think Hegel is interested in freedom in relat-
ing freedom to autonomy. There seems to be broad agreement that the Hege-
lian view of autonomy culminates in a social view of freedom encompassing 
both the individual and the group, which different observers often understand 
as an expansion of the Kantian view of morality into the social realm. Yet 
there is no consensus about how to understand the Hegelian view of social 
freedom. 
Different observers emphasize one or more aspects of autonomy in pointing to 
the need to surpass the individual level. The popular stress in the Hegel debate 
on freedom as autonomy, and autonomy as not moral but ethical, is part of the 
answer. Yet it fails to identify the specific problem or problems Hegel’s theory is 
meant to address. More specifically, it neglects to examine Rousseau’s influential 
restatement of the question of human flourishing in the form of the modern in-
dustrial state, something that for both Kant and the post-Kantian Hegel requires 
a constructivist approach. At a minimum this means that, unlike Marx, who de-
nies that human beings flourish or even could flourish in modern industrial so-
ciety, for Hegel they can and do flourish as a group within the institutions they 
construct for themselves and within which they “recognize” themselves as at home 
so to speak. 
Marx’s Hegelianism and Human Flourishing
Hegel’s conception of social freedom is not, like Kant’s view of morality, based on 
rational self-determination, that is, on successfully formulating and following a 
self-constructed, universalizable rule, a rule valid in all times and places. It is rath-
er based on the idea that the human world is a social construct in which we find 
or recognize ourselves as who we potentially are, and in the right conditions can 
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through development become, in interaction with others and within the institu-
tions of the modern state. 
Marx’s conception of social freedom builds on Hegel’s, with the latter claiming 
that capitalism and freedom are compatible, and that the institution of the private 
ownership of the means of production is a basic prerequisite of human freedom. 
But Marx comprehends this as a main source of the modern inability to achieve 
human self-development beyond the minimal level of meeting basic or reproduc-
tive needs. Marx clearly rejects the Hegelian approach on this point, but he relies 
on it in another way. 
Marx’s main suggestion for human flourishing in modern industrial society lies in 
a Hegelian distinction suggested (but not worked out) in the Elements of the Phi-
losophy of Right between objectification and alienation. Elsewhere I have argued 
that the constructivist approach runs throughout and links together Kant, Fichte 
and Hegel, the main German idealists. This view of cognition, which is central to 
the critical philosophy, is widely known as the Copernican revolution in philoso-
phy, but rarely studied in detail. (see Rockmore 2016)
German idealist thinkers (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and in my view Marx but not 
Schelling) are linked together by the effort to formulate a successful version of con-
structivism. This view comes into classical German philosophy in the often-men-
tioned but rarely examined Copernican revolution. Hegel’s theory of freedom in 
the modern world, for instance, relies on identifying with and recognizing oneself 
in the institutions of modern industrial society that one has constructed. Marx, 
who rejects the view that significant freedom is possible in modern capitalism, 
contends it will be possible after the abolition of private ownership of the means 
of production in postmodern communism. 
The development of finite human beings as individuals depends on the future 
separation of objectification and alienation. Marx follows the Hegelian view of 
objectification, both early and late. In the Paris Manuscripts he identifies aliena-
tion as the result of objectification in the capitalist period. In Capital vol. 1 in the 
chapter on “The Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret,” he points out that 
the human quality of labour takes on an objective form in the process of produc-
tion. Objectification has a dual function as the presupposition of alienation as well 
as self-development as a human individual. In making, producing or constructing 
an object, for instance, a commodity destined for sale in the market place, an in-
dividual, as Hegel notes in the master-slave analysis, also “objectifies” himself in 
the form of the object. Objectification is further the way in which a person gives 
external manifestation to the future individual in developing one’s capacities be-
yond merely meeting one’s reproductive needs as a fully individual human being.
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Human Flourishing and Chinese Marxism
Hegelian Marxism is based on the idea of the revolutionary subject as self-de-
veloping in and through its interaction with others and the surrounding nat-
ural world. Anti-Hegelian Marxism in all its forms is based, as already noted, 
on revolutionary self-development through knowledge of the so-called law 
of human history. I have argued that Marx is a critical Hegelian, and that his 
Hegelianism is central to his self-assigned task of resolving the problem of 
human flourishing through the transition from capitalism to communism. I 
have further argued that Chinese Marxism is a form of classical, non-Hege-
lian Marxism. In short, non-Hegelian forms of Marxism, including Chinese 
Marxism, are incompatible with the Marxian project. 
Western and Eastern conceptions of human being differ in fundamental ways. 
Marx and Confucius thus present humanistic views of the world based on dif-
ferent conceptions of finite human being. The Western model stresses a view of 
the individual that is very different from the Chinese model that, though there 
are many variations on this theme, overall stresses the group. The modern West-
ern model of the individual emerges over many years. It is already beginning 
to take shape in the Magna Carta, in which the English people won rights in 
relation to the king. This basically secular conception later crystallized in the 
American Constitution in the phrase life, liberty and happiness. It was restated 
during the French Revolution as liberty, equality and fraternity, and more recent-
ly reformulated as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Marx, who is a 
Westerner, understands human beings based on the Western model of a person 
endowed with inalienable rights, that if necessary justify revolution and develop 
through the basic transformation, hence the relative discontinuity, of modern 
Western society.
In contrast, Chinese Marxism insists on a strong continuity with the Chinese 
tradition, especially Confucianism, which stresses family and social harmony, 
hence social stability. Though there are many different interpretations of Con-
fucianism, it will suffice here to say that it stresses family, fixed social roles, 
and social harmony, for instance the practical order, rites, loyalty and filial 
piety. According to Confucianism, social harmony requires that every indi-
vidual play a predetermined part in the natural order and play that part well. 
As Confucius writes, “There is government, when the prince is prince, and the 
minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son.” (Confucius 
12: 48)
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Two Criticisms
It will be useful to anticipate two obvious criticisms to the ideas outlined above. I 
have argued that Marxism is basically anti-Hegelian and Marx is basically Hege-
lian. I have further suggested that the conceptions of human beings in East and 
West are basically different. It could be objected that there is no strict distinction 
between Hegelian and non-Hegelian, or even anti-Hegelian, Marxism, since the 
development of Marxism is more complex and, instead of a sharp distinction, 
there is a continuous series of Marxist views that are more or less Hegelian, since 
none is purely anti-Hegelian and none is purely Hegelian. It could further be 
objected that the idea of an opposition between a Western conception of human 
being or man (ren) and an Eastern, basically Confucian conception is an exag-
geration, since Confucianism is a collection of different doctrines including, say, 
Xunxian (and legalist) “state-oriented and Mengxian “aesthetic-ethically” orient-
ed conceptions. 
In my view there is merit in both objections. In a sense, it is correct that there is 
always continuity as well as difference, and the degree of continuity as well as dif-
ference is a function of interpretation. This is the case both for the extent to which 
Marx is Hegelian, and the extent to which Marxism of all kinds is anti-Hegelian. 
Marx’s own Hegelianism is important enough for him to call attention in the Af-
terword to the second edition of Capital, despite his critical relation to Hegel, to 
his role as a pupil of the German philosopher. Marx, who was trained as a philoso-
pher according to the standards of the day, and thus thoroughly steeped in Hegel. 
This has, with very few exceptions, above all Lukács, never been the case for either 
traditional Russian or Chinese Marxism, where a grasp of Hegel, whose views are 
not well understood, is undermined by the conviction that Marx supersedes him 
or at least leaves him behind.
Marx, of course, does not hold any version of this view. He clearly indicates his 
belief that the correct way to appropriate Hegel’s dialectic is to turn it right side 
up. In this respect, Engels has a thoroughly muddled and finally problematic role. 
Engels holds a contradictory view of Hegel. On the one hand, we recall that 
Feuerbach, on whom Engels relies in claiming that Marx turned away from phi-
losophy, hence from Hegel, was a minor Hegelian, later a minor critic of Hegel, 
and an important Protestant theologian. Yet Engels, who was not trained in phi-
losophy, and who was most familiar with Schelling among the German idealists, 
thinks that Feuerbach is the only contemporary philosophical genius. He believes, 
as noted, that Marx simply threw Hegel aside in following Feuerbach away from 
idealism, away from philosophy, and toward science. This gross exaggeration vastly 
overestimates Feuerbach’s influence on Marx, which was initially important, but 
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quickly faded. On the other hand, Engels also says, in contradicting the former 
view, German socialists are proud to trace their descent from Kant, Fichte and 
Hegel. (Engels 1989, 24: 459) This point is correct, but Engels, in insisting that 
Marx left philosophy behind, undermines it.
The other objection is supported by the development of Confucianism that con-
sists of the original view worked out by Confucius as well as related doctrines add-
ed to it over the centuries. Now different sources point to differences in emphasis, 
and though this suggests the need to take differences in emphasis into account, it 
does mean there is not a central conceptual Confucian core series of beliefs very 
different from the Western view of human beings, nor suggest that the differences 
in the different forms of Confucianism are so important as to invalidate the dif-
ferences not merely in degree, but also in kind, between the Western and Chinese 
views of humans. 
Hegel, Marx and Chinese Marxism 
Marxism takes different forms as part of the continuing effort to realize Marx’s 
project, which is interpreted in different, even incompatible ways. This paper 
has studied the relation between Hegel, Marx and Chinese Marxism in calling 
attention to four points. First, it points to the theme of human flourishing as 
Marx’s central problem. Second, it links Marx’s proposed solution to realizing 
individuality in a future post-capitalist phase. Third, it suggests that Marx’s 
understanding of the practical conditions of human flourishing in terms of 
individuals in a future form of the world depends on his critical Hegelian per-
spective. Fourth, it identifies basic differences between Western and Eastern, 
or a specifically Chinese, view, in suggesting that, in virtue of his dependence 
on Hegel, Marx relies on a specifically Western model of the human individual. 
My conclusion follows directly from these four points. The so-called Chinese 
Dream incorrectly suggests that Chinese Marxism focuses or at least carries 
further a conception shared by Marx, Chinese Marxism and contemporary 
China. Marx is, on the contrary, concerned with a Western view of the individ-
ual on a critical Hegelian basis. Chinese Marxism, which is not Hegelian, and 
is not more Hegelian than Russian Marxism or classical Marxism, is mainly 
concerned with a traditional Confucian conception of the human being. This 
conception is opposed to the Western model as well to its Marxian variation. 
I thus conclude that the so-called Chinese Dream is unlikely to reach Marx’s 
goal, since the Western and Eastern conceptions of human being are essentially 
different.
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